Choosing Strategy in a Fractured World
Mark Carney’s words at Davos reverberated far beyond Canada, striking a chord in New Delhi with an urgency that cannot be ignored. By describing the present moment as a rupture rather than a transition, Carney stripped away the comforting illusions of continuity and exposed the harsh reality of a world where the old anchors of stability—American restraint, predictable alliances, and a broadly respected rules-based order—are crumbling. For India, a nation that has long balanced principle with pragmatism and autonomy with engagement, this is not merely a diplomatic observation but a profound challenge to its survival and aspirations.
The United States, once the architect of the system, now openly questions the sovereignty of allies, dismisses institutional limits, and frames global politics in terms of raw strength. The bargain that allowed middle powers to tolerate selective hypocrisy in exchange for stability and open markets is breaking down. When rules apply only when convenient, smaller and middle powers are left exposed. India, neither marginal nor subordinate, finds itself vulnerable to coercion—economic, technological, and strategic. Trade dependencies, concentrated supply chains, and security partnerships can all be weaponised in a transactional world. Carney’s warning is not alarmism but clarity: deference and wishful thinking are luxuries India can no longer afford.
India’s instinct for strategic autonomy now appears prescient. Yet autonomy does not mean isolation; it demands sharper choices, stronger partnerships, and greater internal resilience. The era of assuming that global stability will be guaranteed by a single power is over. India must invest deliberately in coalitions of the like-minded, while retaining the flexibility that has defined its foreign policy. Natural partners include Japan, Australia, Canada, the European Union, ASEAN nations, and selective engagement with Africa and Latin America. Forums such as the Quad, BRICS, and G20 are not ends in themselves but instruments that must deliver tangible coordination on supply chains, technology standards, climate finance, and development pathways. Institutions matter only if they work, and India has both the credibility and the interest to push for reform rather than abandonment.
Carney’s warning about globalization as a channel of coercion speaks directly to India’s experience. From energy security to pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, over-dependence creates strategic vulnerability. India’s push for manufacturing resilience, diversified trade routes, and digital public infrastructure is not protectionism but prudence. Reducing exposure does not mean closing doors; it means ensuring that engagement is not one-sided or easily weaponised. Engagement with competing powers, including China and the United States, must be grounded in realism. Dialogue with China does not erase unresolved border tensions, just as partnership with the U.S. does not imply unquestioning alignment. Strategic maturity lies in managing contradictions without surrendering agency.
What makes this moment emotionally charged is the sense of finality. As Carney suggested, there is no return to a pre-Trump innocence. The world has seen too much, and trust once fractured cannot be restored by rhetoric alone. For India, this is both a risk and an opportunity. The erosion of old certainties creates instability, but it also opens space for leadership that is principled without being naïve. Democracy, multilateralism, and cooperation still matter, but they must be defended by consistency rather than convenience. India’s credibility will rest on aligning its words with its actions, whether in trade negotiations, climate commitments, or regional diplomacy. Moral authority today flows less from declarations and more from reliability.
There is strength in solidarity, but it must be solidarity among equals, not dependence on a single guarantor. India’s task is not to replace any power but to help shape a more balanced and resilient order. That demands patience, strategic investment, and the willingness to act with others even when outcomes are uncertain. Carney’s warning is ultimately a reminder that history does not pause for comfort. India, like other rising and middle powers, is being asked to choose—not sides, but seriousness. The world is changing whether we like it or not. The real question is whether India will merely adapt to this rupture or step forward to help define what comes next.
